"The Kiev regime and Europe are the main obstacle to a peaceful settlement today"
As a result of the agreements reached with Ukraine in Istanbul, Russia managed to return about 2.3 thousand military personnel and about 170 civilians. This was reported to Izvestia by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin. About 200 bodies of the dead soldiers were also handed over to Moscow, he added. In 2025, Russia and Ukraine held three rounds of talks in Istanbul, but in November Kiev announced the termination of meetings in this format. He interrupted the dialogue with Moscow without responding to a number of initiatives, including the creation of three working groups on military, political and humanitarian issues, Galuzin said. Moldova is following in Ukraine's footsteps, which is consistently dismantling relations with Russia, he stressed. About the prospects of the Transnistrian settlement and the dynamics of Russia's relations with the countries of the Transcaucasia — in an exclusive interview with Mikhail Galuzin "Izvestia".
"We managed to return approximately 2.3 thousand of our soldiers to their homeland in Russia"
— In a recent interview, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, commenting on the Ukrainian settlement, noted that the Zelensky regime and its European curators are not ready for constructive negotiations. After the telephone conversation between the presidents of Russia and the United States on December 28, and the negotiations between the United States and Ukraine at Donald Trump's estate at Mar-a-Lago, have there been any signals from Kiev to continue direct contacts with Russia?
— On December 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with US President Donald Trump, and during it, as Russian Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said in his commentary, the parties spoke in favor of a truly long-term, sustainable settlement of the conflict. This is not about some kind of temporary truce, but about a final comprehensive solution. For a final settlement, and, consequently, a final ceasefire, it is necessary that the Kiev regime, without delay, make a bold and responsible political decision regarding Donbass — a decision that would be in line with the work that is being carried out through the Russian-American channel.
Let me also remind you that President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting at the command post of the United Group of Forces on December 27, noted that smart people had appeared in the West who were giving the Kiev regime proposals for a dignified solution to the Ukrainian crisis. They propose conditions that would allow ending the conflict, restoring relations with Russia, and ensuring further economic recovery and development of Ukraine. But, unfortunately, the Kiev regime is in no hurry to take advantage of these sensible proposals.
As for us, back on June 14, 2024, the Russian president spoke at the Foreign Ministry and outlined decent conditions for the Kiev regime to show sobriety and agree to a long-term, fair and sustainable settlement. Let's see how the regime will react.
In general, returning to your question, I would like to remind you that some time ago, the Ukrainian side, through its First Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislitsa, announced through the media that it was interrupting the Istanbul process at least until the end of the year. This is the answer to your question about contacts.
And you are right, quoting Sergey Lavrov, that the Kiev regime and Europe are today the main obstacle to a peaceful settlement, because Western European countries, with rare exceptions, due to their irrational obsession with Russophobia, hoping in vain that they will be able to inflict the notorious strategic defeat on Russia, pump the Kiev regime with weapons and money. Moreover, they do this by imposing a very heavy burden on their own taxpayers. They are hatching plans to deploy some kind of military forces in Ukraine, trying to present them as some kind of peacekeeping units.
That is, as the minister said, it turns out that they do not feel sorry not only for the Ukrainians, whom they send to the furnace of military operations, but also for their own population. On the one hand, if NATO armed formations appeared in Ukraine, they would immediately become a legitimate target for the Russian armed forces. On the other hand, they do not feel sorry for their own taxpayers, who are being forced to fork out for very dubious and, most importantly, absolutely hopeless adventures of the Kiev regime.
— In other words, there is no Istanbul format anymore?
— I wouldn't talk about whether there is one or not. I'm talking about the fact that the Ukrainian side has interrupted the Istanbul talks. She interrupted, by the way, without responding to a number of initiatives that the Russian side had introduced. This is also a package of proposals on security guarantees. These are proposals to concretize and intensify the work of the Istanbul process — to create three working groups on military, political and humanitarian issues. All of this remained unanswered.
It was categorically said through the media that the Ukrainian side was interrupting the Istanbul process. However, we have not received any official notifications in this regard.
— Are there any informal contacts with the Ukrainian delegation?
— I am not aware of such contacts.
— The most important achievement in the framework of the negotiations in Istanbul was the humanitarian agreement on the exchange of prisoners and bodies of military personnel. Were they completed to the end?
— In any case, this is a time-consuming process. But one way or another, as a result of the agreements reached in Istanbul, approximately 2.3 thousand of our soldiers and about 170 civilians were able to return to their homeland in Russia. As for the Ukrainian side, about 2,400 military personnel and about 170 civilians were returned to them.
Unfortunately, 12 of our citizens are still being forcibly detained, who were forcibly abducted from the Kursk region during the bandit invasion of the Ukrainian militants in the region. In addition, we have handed over to the Ukrainian side about 12,000 bodies of their dead soldiers. About 200 bodies have been returned to us. This process, I believe, will continue. You are right, indeed, there is a very serious, positive effect from the discussions that took place in Istanbul.
— Is there a chance that the Ukrainian crisis may end in 2026?
— I would not like to set any time landmarks here. Actually, no one does this. I would like to draw your attention once again to the position of the Russian side, outlined by Yuri Ushakov in a commentary following a telephone conversation between our leaders, that the Kiev regime should immediately and without delay make a responsible political decision on Donbass, which would be in line with the understandings reached during Russian-American contacts, primarily on the Anchorage summit.
This means that we do not intend to artificially delay anything. On the contrary, we are determined that after the Kiev regime makes such a decision, there will be a final cease-fire and a settlement of the conflict.
"Chisinau is consistently dismantling Russian-Moldovan relations"
— In 2025, presidential elections were held in Moldova, following which Maia Sandu remained the head of state. Chisinau has taken a number of unfriendly steps towards the Russian Federation, including the decision to close the Russian House. Does this mean that normalization of political relations with Moldova is no longer possible?
— Today, Russian-Moldovan relations have been at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries in 1992. That's a fact. And, strictly speaking, the reason lies in the pro-Western and at the same time anti-Russian course pursued by the Moldovan leadership, in my opinion, extremely short-sighted, following the path that Ukraine has followed and is following. This is, of course, sad.
Moldovan President Maia Sandu
The Moldovan leadership is consistently dismantling Russian-Moldovan relations, severing ties and cooperation with integration structures, primarily the CIS, and curtailing relations with other countries of the former Soviet Union. In my opinion, this is an absolutely dead-end and destructive course. The denunciation of the agreement on the establishment and operation of cultural centers became another manifestation of it already in the execution of the new government of Moldova. It is publicly stated that the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Chisinau will cease its work in July 2026. And, of course, while such actions by the Moldovan side are being carried out, it is quite difficult to talk about the prospect of normalization of Russian-Moldovan relations, and it would hardly be realistic.
On the other hand, we see and feel that Moldovan society is determined to cherish the long-standing historical good relations between Moldova and Russia and normalize bilateral relations. And the Russian side, in turn, is always open to constructive dialogue with the Moldovan side to improve our relations.
— Many Moldovan citizens are indeed still in favor of maintaining ties with Russia. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to take into account the factor of administrative resources. In addition, Moldovan prisons are overcrowded with representatives of the opposition. The most high-profile case this year was that of Gagauzia's leader Yevgenia Hutsul, who was sentenced to seven years in prison. Does Moldovan democracy have any chances in these conditions, and what can Russia do here?
— Look, indeed, the Moldovan leadership is already notorious for using methods of pressure, blackmail, intimidation, and unsubstantiated criminal proceedings against opposition forces. This is already the "black business card" of official Chisinau for today. And it is very significant that the focus of such repressive activities of the Moldovan authorities are those who advocate normalization of relations with Russia, those who advocate Moldova's interaction with Eurasian integration structures. That is, people who really think about the future of their country and understand that it cannot be built on the basis of severing centuries-old ties with its closest neighbors, primarily with Russia.
On August 5, the Chisinau court sentenced Evgenia Gutsul to seven years in prison on charges of violations in financing the opposition Shor party
And, of course, the apotheosis of such repression and persecution of opposition forces was the sentencing of the head of the autonomous territorial entity of Gagauzia, Evgenia Hutsul. We have already said more than once that this is an absolutely unsubstantiated politicized repressive decision against an opposition figure. Naturally, Russia does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states, but against the background of the lawlessness and rampant lawlessness that we are witnessing in Moldova today, of course, it is impossible to remain silent.
Therefore, we are trying to draw the attention of the international community and the human rights movement to these absolutely illegal methods of fighting the opposition, which are practiced by official Chisinau, and we will use multilateral platforms for this. Of course, we are very seriously concerned about the current situation in Moldova in this regard.
— The Moldovan authorities declare that they are pursuing a course towards the reintegration of Transnistria. How much is it possible in the near future? And is there a dialogue between Moldova and Russia about this?
— It has been said for a long time that the Moldovan leadership wants to reintegrate Transnistria. But we haven't seen anything concrete — we haven't seen any documents or concepts in this regard. Instead, we see something else: not attempts at reintegration on some healthy basis and taking into account the interests of Pridnestrovians, but economic, legal, media, and psychological pressure on the leadership of Pridnestrovie and its residents. That's the first thing.
Secondly, the notorious European integration project is at the heart of the official Chisinau's anti-Russian policy. And today, as far as we understand, Moldova is rather discussing whether to integrate with the European Union with or without Transnistria. But it seems to me that such a statement of the issue is premature in conditions when repressive measures are being implemented against Pridnestrovie, firstly. Secondly, as far as I know, no one has asked the Pridnestrovians themselves whether they want the notorious European integration.
And finally, Chisinau has no dialogue with either Tiraspol or Russia. And in general, it seems that some people in Chisinau would like to solve the Transnistrian problem without Russia's participation and without taking into account its interests. And this, of course, is absolutely unacceptable. The Russian Federation has always been and remains a proponent of resolving the Transnistrian problem based on the principles that were enshrined in the July 1992 agreement. We are ready to conduct a dialogue within the framework of the 5+2 mechanism in accordance with the aforementioned agreement and on a bilateral basis. So our position here is very clear, consistent and understandable.
— It turns out that Chisinau is not currently conducting a dialogue with Russia on the reintegration of Transnistria...
— Chisinau does not have any dialogue with us at all. He is dismantling relations with our country, as it seems to me, to the detriment of his own interests and certainly to the detriment of the interests of the Moldovan population.
Up to a certain point, discussions were held within the framework of the "5+2" mechanism in accordance with the 1992 agreement. There are no such discussions now. Currently, this mechanism, although we believe that it can continue to play a positive role in terms of finding ways to resolve the Transnistrian problem, is in a frozen state. As I said, they are trying to oust Russia from the Transnistrian regulatory process.
Flags of Russia and Transnistria
As for his specific scenarios, of course, we keep in mind all possible options for the notorious reintegration of Transnistria. Of course, we want to believe the words coming from Chisinau that this reintegration will be exclusively peaceful. But, it is true, the fact that, contrary to Moldova's neutral status enshrined in the constitution, the Moldovan leadership is carrying out an accelerated militarization of its country and the fact that it is moving towards rapprochement with NATO and the European Union, of course, may indicate the opposite.
In any case, we proceed from the fact that we have all the necessary methods and means to protect Russian citizens living in Transnistria, and there are about 200,000 of them.
"Armenia is our ally and strategic partner"
— In early December, Armenia and the European Union adopted a new Strategic Partnership Agenda. This document is intended to deepen cooperation between the Republic and the EU. Has Armenia discussed this step with Russia?
— Armenia is our ally and strategic partner, and these fundamental parameters of our relations do not change. We proceed precisely from this nature of our relations with Armenia. As for her right to maintain relations with any country and association, including the European Union, we believe that this is the right of any sovereign country. But cooperation is one thing. But integration is another matter. And what we see in the new strategic agenda of the Armenia—EU partnership is, as we understand it, integration, which includes the harmonization of Armenia's regulatory framework with relevant EU standards in key areas such as politics, security, economy, energy, ecology, and so on.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and EU Diplomacy Chief Josep Borrell at a press conference after the EU-USA-Armenia trilateral meeting.
And we tell our Armenian colleagues honestly and frankly that such harmonization of the regulatory framework with the EU will inevitably conflict with the relevant norms of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which includes Armenia. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring possible contradictions between Armenia's policy of harmonizing its regulatory framework with the norms of the European Union and the relevant rules of the EAEU.
We are honestly and frankly discussing these topics in appropriate formats, in particular within the framework of the bilateral intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation, which last met on December 17 in Yerevan.
And, of course, we were pleased to note that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended both the meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council in Moscow (December 11) and the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in St. Petersburg (December 21) in December, and confirmed Armenia's commitment to continue participating in Eurasian integration building. We hope that this will be the case. Moreover, Armenia has been a member of the EAEU since 2015. And, of course, during these 10 years, we are sure that the Armenian society and the country's leadership have felt all the significant benefits of membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.
For example, in 2015, when Armenia joined the EAEU, its GDP was about $10.5 billion, and today it is already $26 billion, which is more than a twofold increase. And we see that Armenia's trade with the Union countries is also growing. Today, this is almost $14 billion, and the free access of Armenian products to the markets of the EAEU countries has already led to the fact that most of Armenia's trade is with the EAEU and, above all, with our country, Russia.
For example, in the first 10 months of this year, according to our available statistics, Armenia's exports amounted to $6.4 billion. Of these, 2.6 billion go to the EAEU countries, primarily to Russia, which accounts for 37% of Armenia's exports. And only half a billion dollars is exported to the European Union. So there are obvious big, huge benefits for Armenia from membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, on the one hand. On the other hand, it is clear that if a country is a member of one association with supranational regulation, then its entry into another association (also with supranational regulation according to completely different standards) calls into question membership in the first one.
This is the current situation. We hope that we will continue to cooperate with Armenia within the framework of the EAEU, especially since the Armenian side confirms this at the senior leadership level.
— It is clear that Armenia benefits from its participation in the EAEU. Do your Armenian colleagues demonstrate an understanding of the arguments that you have just presented?
— In my impression, there is such an understanding.
— Are Russia and Armenia discussing Yerevan's return to full-fledged participation in the CSTO?
— First of all, Armenia remains a member of the CSTO with all rights and obligations. Armenia is aware of all the decisions that are made within the framework of the organization. And, of course, we actively advocate for Armenia to participate fully in the work of the CSTO, since it is absolutely obvious that it is precisely with it that the truly reliable security of Armenia, as well as other members of this association, is connected. Of course, we would be happy to see just such a result.
A soldier during the command and staff exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
— Earlier, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that if a CSTO member state fails to fulfill its obligations within the organization, in particular if it is in arrears to the budget for two years, it may be subject to suspension of the right to nominate citizens of this state to quota positions within the CSTO, as well as deprivation of the right to vote in the organs of the organization until the full repayment of the debt. Does Russia see any signals from Armenia that it is ready to resolve the debt situation to the CSTO?
— We are in dialogue with our Armenian colleagues. Let's wait for the outcome of this dialogue.
"In economics, the year can be safely considered an asset of our relations"
— At the end of November, you had a meeting with the Azerbaijani Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Rakhman Mustafayev, which resulted in the success of promoting bilateral economic cooperation. How would you describe the state of the political dialogue between Russia and Azerbaijan?
— The past year has been quite difficult for Russian-Azerbaijani relations, of course, but nevertheless we have managed to move forward economically. First of all, we are talking about the fact that the volume of trade has increased. Last year it was about $4.5 billion, but today we expect to reach over $5 billion. Despite the fact that last year the volume of trade also increased.
We discussed all issues related to our economic agenda very productively in August this year within the framework of the Russian-Azerbaijani intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation, whose session was held in Astrakhan. In addition, since the end of last year, we have managed to make serious progress in cooperation on the formation of the eastern branch of the North–South international transport corridor, and we are working on this together, including with our Iranian colleagues. So in economics, the year can be safely considered an asset of our relations.
In the second half of the year, the high rhythm of the interstate political dialogue between Russia and Azerbaijan was restored. First of all, I must mention the crucial importance of the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on October 9 in Dushanbe at the CIS summit. It is extremely important that the leaders confirmed their mutual commitment to further build Russian-Azerbaijani relations in line with the Declaration on Allied Cooperation signed in February 2022.
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin during a meeting at the Kohi Somon Government Residence
It is very important that contacts continued at the government level, through the inter-parliamentary line. As for the channel at the Foreign Ministry level, we held very meaningful consultations with my colleague, Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Samir Sharifov, in Baku on December 9-10. In addition, I had the opportunity to meet with the assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, Hikmet Hajiyev. Thus, the dialogue has resumed. And the President of the Russian Federation has clearly outlined our position on an issue of particular concern to our Azerbaijani colleagues — our common tragedy, namely the crash of an Azerbaijani passenger liner near the Kazakh city of Aktau on December 25, 2024, when citizens of Azerbaijan, Russia and other countries were killed. Of course, the Russian side will continue to act in line with the guidelines that the Russian president outlined at a meeting with Ilham Aliyev on October 9 in Dushanbe.
— Is there any progress in the release of 11 Russian citizens detained in Baku on June 30 – July 1 this year?
— Of course, this is one of the key priorities of our work in the Azerbaijani direction today. We are seeking the early release of the detained Russian citizens. We strive to ensure that their legitimate rights are respected. In particular, the consent of the Azerbaijani side was recently obtained for the repeated consular access of our diplomats to these citizens, to our compatriots. So this issue is firmly on the agenda, and we will continue to seek the release of our compatriots as soon as possible.
Russian House in Baku
— Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov said that the issue of the closure of the Russian House in Baku is finally closed. Is Russia discussing this topic?
— We are in favor of restoring, of course, their cultural and humanitarian component, which is very important, including Russia's presence in the cultural and humanitarian space of Azerbaijan, as part of the general process of normalization of our relations. Of course, this is one of the topics on our agenda.
— Is it the restoration of the Russian House?
— The restoration of our humanitarian presence, including the work of the Russian House.
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